We introduce a first sequent-style calculus for witnessed Gödel logic. Our calculus makes use of the cut rule. We show that this is inescapable by establishing a general result on the non-existence of suitable analytic calculi for a large class of first-order logics. These include witnessed Gödel logic, (fragments of) Łukasiewicz logic, and intuitionistic logic extended with the quantifiers of classical logic.
Introduction
(First-order) Gödel logic is a prominent example of both a many-valued and a superintuitionistic logic. The importance of Gödel logic is emphasized by the fact that it turns up naturally in a number of different contexts; among them relevance logics, fuzzy logic, and logic programming. Witnessed Gödel logic G w arises from Gödel logic by interpreting the quantifier ∀ (resp. ∃) as minimum (resp. maximum) instead of infimum (resp. supremum). As computers have a limited precision, and reasoning w.r.t. general models is typically harder than reasoning w.r.t. witnessed models [19, 20] , G w is more appealing than Gödel logic for many applications, see, e.g., [12] . The proof theory of Gödel logic has been well-investigated. As a result various "well-behaved" (or analytic) calculi -in which proofs proceed by stepwise decomposition of the formulas to be proved-have been introduced, and successfully used to prove important properties of this logic; e.g., the Herbrand theorem for prenex formulas or the admissibility of suitable rules. These calculi are defined in formalisms that generalize sequent calculus; among them hypersequent and labelled calculus [2, 21, 22] .
In contrast to Gödel logic, the only existing calculus for G w is a Hilbert system [20, 3] , which is difficult to use even for finding simple proofs manually. The question that we address is: can we define a "well-behaved" calculus for G w using the sequent calculus or a suitable generalization?
To answer this question, we first define what we mean by a "well-behaved" calculus. There are indeed many formalisms for constructing calculi and outside of the sequent calculus there is no established notion of what is meant by a "well-behaved", or analytic calculus 1 ; for example proofs in the Calculus of Structures [17, 13] or display logic [10] might contain logical or structural connectives that do not appear in the formulas to be proved and are not universally considered "well-behaved", e.g. [23] .
In this paper we propose an operational and formalism-independent notion of "well-behaved" calculus (∃-analytic). This arises as an attempt to answer the fundamental question what do we expect from a proof theoretic treatment of a first-order logic?. Our answer is: a relaxed notion of the subformula property and the extraction of minimal information from proofs of simple existential statements, i.e., a weak form of Herbrand theorem. We call ∃-analytic any calculus satisfying these properties. The calculi for Gödel logic in [2, 21, 22] are ∃-analytic and so are all calculi in the various formalisms that are presented as "well-behaved" (or called analytic).
Having provided a precise definition of the notion of ∃-analyticity, we show that a large class of logics, including G w , cannot have such calculi. The paper is organized as follows: Section 3 introduces a first sequent-style calculus RG f o ∞ for G w . Our calculus, defined in the formalism of sequents of relations, is obtained by extending the calculus for propositional Gödel logic in [4] by natural quantifier rules. Though finding proofs in RG f o ∞ turns out to be easier than in the Hilbert system for G w , RG f o ∞ makes use of the cut rule; as shown in Section 4, this is the case, e.g., when proving prenex formulas that are valid in G w but not in Gödel logic; in the same section it is also shown the undecidability of the problem to determine, given a proof in RG f o ∞ , if there is a cut-free proof of the same formulas. Section 5 shows that the non redundancy of the cut rule in RG f o ∞ is unavoidable by introducing a general criterion for a first-order logic expressed Hilbert-style not to admit any ∃-analytic calculus. Our criterion applies to a large class of logics including G w , the fragment 2 of Łukasiewicz logic axiomatized in [18] , and intuitionistic logic extended with the quantifiers of classical logic, thus establishing the non-existence of a "well-behaved" calculus for them.
Witnessed Gödel logic
The language of Gödel logic is the same as that of intuitionistic first-order logic and it is based on the binary connectives ∧, ∨, and ⊃, the quantifiers ∃, ∀, and the truth constants 0 and 1; as usual ¬A abbreviates A ⊃ 0.
Semantically Gödel logic can 3 be viewed as an infinite-valued logic with the real interval [0, 1] as set of truth values, see, e.g., [15] . In this setting an interpretation I consists of a non-empty domain D and a valuation v I that maps constant symbols and object variables into elements of D and n-ary function symbols to functions from D n into D; v I extends in the usual way to a function mapping all terms of the language to an element of the domain. Moreover, every n-ary predicate symbol p is mapped to a function
The truth value of an atomic for-mula p(t 1 , . . . , t n ) is defined as
The semantics of propositional connectives and truth constants is given by
0 I = 0 and
For quantification we define the distribution of a formula A with respect to a free variable x in an interpretation I as distr
denotes the interpretation that is exactly as I, except for insisting on
The universal and existential quantifiers correspond to the infimum and supremum, respectively, in the following sense:
As usual a formula is valid if it is evaluated to 1 under every interpretation. n , 1} as set of truth values leads to the n + 1-valued Gödel logic G n , which is recursively axiomatizable. The Gödel logic whose valid formulas are those valid in all G n , for n ∈ N , is denoted by G ↑ and has V = {1 − 1/n : n ≥ 1} ∪ {1}. G ↑ is not recursively axiomatizable. First-order Gödel logic with V = [0, 1] is usually referred to as standard Gödel logic (or simply Gödel logic) and denoted by G ∞ .
A Hilbert axiomatization of (standard) Gödel logic is obtained by extending that of first-order intuitionistic logic with the axiom of linearity (P ⊃ Q) ∨ (Q ⊃ P ) and the "quantifier shift" axiom ∀x(
, where the notation Q (x) indicates that there is no free occurrence of x in Q. Witnessed Gödel logic G w is a natural variant of Gödel logic. It arises by considering only witnessed interpretations, that is interpretations where the truth value of each quantified formula coincides with the truth value of some if its instances, see [20] . In our notation this means an interpretation v I such that:
G w was axiomatized in [20, 3] by adding to the Hilbert system for Gödel logic both axioms ∃x(P (x) ⊃ ∀yP (y)) and ∃x(∃yP (y) ⊃ P (x)) expressing that each infimum is a minimum, and each supremum is a maximum, respectively.
Like in intuitionistic logic, also in Gödel logic quantifiers cannot be shifted arbitrarily. In other words, in general, arbitrary formulas are not equivalent to prenex formulas (that is in which quantifiers are always in front). In contrast, G w admits an equivalent prenex normal form as in classical logic.
Finally, recall that Skolemization holds for the prenex fragment of Gödel logic [9, 7] and it can be easily proved for witnessed Gödel logic.
The calculus RG f o ∞
We introduce a sequent-style calculus for witnessed Gödel logic. Our calculus uses sequents of relations, which are disjunctions of semantic predicates over formulas [4] .
Various analytic calculi have been defined for Gödel logic at the propositional level. Among them, Avron's hypersequent calculus [1, 2] and the sequent calculus of relations RG ∞ [4] . The basic objects in these calculi have the form
where the symbol " | " is interpreted as a (commutative) disjunction at the meta-level and
Γ is a multiset of formulas and ∆ either a formula or the empty set, while
• (in the sequent calculus of relations) each S i is a relation A i ✁ B i , where ✁ stands for either < or ≤ and A i , B i are formulas.
By adding to Avron's hypersequent calculus the natural hypersequent rules for quantifiers we get the analytic calculus HG ∞ for first-order Gödel logic depicted 4 in Table 1 .
Proposition 2 (e.g. [2, 21] ) A formula P is valid in Gödel logic if and only if ⇒ P is provable in HG ∞ without using the cut rule.
Clearly if ⇒ P is provable in HG ∞ then P is valid in G w . The converse however does not hold. In particular the peculiar axioms ∃x(P (x) ⊃ ∀yP (y)) and ∃x(∃yP (y) ⊃ P (x)) of witnessed Gödel logic cannot be proved in HG ∞ .
To explain the situation for RG ∞ let us first recall its rules from [4] (below H and H ′ stand for a possibly empty sequent of relations): Logical rules: For disjunction and conjunction we have (here and below ✁ stands for either < or ≤, uniformly in each rule): The rules for implication are:
Structural rules: (external) weakening, exchange, contraction, and (cut):
A derivation is considered, as usual, as an upward rooted tree of sequents generated from subtrees by applying the inference rules. A sequent of relations is provable in RG ∞ if the leafs in its derivation are axioms, that is sequents of relations having one of the following forms:
where ✁ i ∈ {<, ≤} and the case n = 1 is defined as
Proposition 3 ([4])
A formula P is valid in propositional Gödel logic if and only if 1 ≤ P is provable in RG ∞ without using (cut).
Let us denote by RG f o ∞ the calculus RG ∞ extended with the natural sequent of relations rules for quantifiers (✁ stands for either < or ≤):
where e is an eigenvariable, i.e., it does not appear in H, α and β.
Definition 4 Let
The soundness of a sequent of relations rule for Gödel logic is defined analogously. ∞ of all the axioms of the Hilbert calculus for G w . This is easy for the axioms of first-order Gödel logic. A proof of 1 ≤ ∃x(P (x) ⊃ ∀yP (y)) is constructed by cutting the (provable) sequents of relations 1 ≤ ∀yP (y) ⊃ ∀yP (y) and 1 ≤ ∃x(P (x) ⊃ ∀yP (y)) | ∀yP (y) ⊃ ∀yP (y) < 1. A derivation of the latter sequent of relations is the following (. . . abbreviates a component left unchanged by a rule application):
is obtained in a similar way by cutting 1 ≤ ∃x(∃yP (y) ⊃ P (x)) | ∃yP (y) ⊃ ∃yP (y) < 1 and 1 ≤ ∃yP (y) ⊃ ∃yP (y). The generalization rule is simulated by (∀ :≤: r), while modus ponens
is simulated by (cut) as follows (C < B | B < 1 | 1 ≤ C is an axiom):
Note that among the quantifier rules of RG f o ∞ , only (∃ :<: l) and (∀ :<: r) are not sound for Gödel logic. Indeed the value of a formula ∀xP (x) under an interpretation v I of Gödel logic is the infimum of the values of P (a), for all elements a of the universe and therefore we might have v I (Q) < v I (P (a)) for all a while v I (Q) ≤ v I (∀xP (x)). (Dually for the rule (∃ :<: l) and supremum).
Proposition 6
∞ without the rules (∃ :<: l) and (∀ :<: r).
Proof Soundness is easy. Completeness is shown by deriving in the calculus all the axioms of the Hilbert system for Gödel logic (easy check).
It is not difficult to see that in the calculus RG f o ∞ without the rules (∃ :<: l) and (∀ :<: r) the cut rule cannot be removed. Indeed a cut-free sequent of relations calculus for Gödel logic is not known, and we conjecture that it cannot be defined as the cut-elimination theorem for RG ∞ strongly relies on the invertibility of all logical rules (see [5] ).
The analytic content of RG f o ∞
We have defined a sequent-style calculus for G w . Its completeness however relies on the use of (cut). Is this rule really needed? This section provides a positive answer to this question. We indeed show that a prenex formula of G w is cut-free provable in RG ∞ easily follows by the existence of prenex formulas that are valid in G w and not in Gödel logic. As a corollary of Theorem 7 and of the undecidability of the prenex fragment of Gödel logic (Lemma 10) we also show the undecidability of the problem of determining, given a proof in RG f o ∞ , if there exists a cut-free proof of the same end sequent. To prove the key theorem below we will use the following results from [7] : Let F be a prenex formula valid in Gödel logic and let ∃xF S (x) be its Skolem form (x abbreviates x 1 , . . . , x k ) (a) Any cut-free proof of ⇒ F in the hypersequent calculus HG ∞ can be stepwise transformed into a cut-free proof containing a quantifier-free hypersequent (called mid-hypersequent) such that below this hypersequent only quantifier rules and (ec) are applied.
(b) Any cut-free proof of ⇒ ∃xF S (x) in HG ∞ can be stepwise transformed into a cut-free proof of ⇒ F in HG ∞ .
Theorem 7 Let F be any prenex formula of G w . 1 ≤ F is cut-free provable in RG Proof (⇐=) By Proposition 2 if F is valid in Gödel logic then there is a cut-free proof d ′ of ⇒ F in the hypersequent calculus HG ∞ . The claim follows by translating this proof into a cut-free proof of 1 ≤ F in RG f o ∞ . A methodology to translate cut-free HG ∞ -proofs of propositional formulas into cut-free proofs in RG ∞ is contained in [6] . The key idea of the translation is to replace in hypersequents the symbol ⇒ with ≤ and use an equivalent version of HG ∞ in which (i) hypersequents A 1 , . . . A n ⇒ B 1 | . . . are fully split, that is they are of the form
and (iii) the communication rule (com) (cf. Table 1 ) has the following form
The missing step between the propositional translation sketched above and the proof of ⇒ F is the mid-hypersequent theorem of [7] (i.e. the result (a) above) which allows us to transform the proof d ′ of ⇒ F separating the quantifier and the propositional part. We can then translate the propositional part of the proof (that is the proof of the mid-hypersequent) into a proof in RG ∞ following the method in [6] . The proof of 1 ≤ F in RG (=⇒) First recall that a prenex formula F := Q 1 y 1 . . . Q n y n P , with Q i ∈ {∀, ∃} is valid in G w if and only if so is its Skolem form ∃xF S (x). By assumption ∃xF S (x) is cut-free provable in RG f o ∞ . We show how to construct a proof of ⇒ F in HG ∞ , and hence, by Proposition 2 that F is valid in Gödel logic.
We first transform the cut-free proof d of 1 ≤ ∃xF
and by replacing all applications of (∃ :≤: r) with suitable applications of (∨ :≤: r). Note that n i=1 F S (t i ) is a propositional formula and it is therefore valid in first-order Gödel logic (recall that the propositional fragments of G w and of Gödel logic do coincide). By Proposition 2 there is a proof of ⇒ n i=1 F S (t i ) in the hypersequent calculus HG ∞ , from which we can construct a proof of ⇒ ∃xF S (x) in HG ∞ as follows: by applying (CU T ) n times between ⇒ n i=1 F S (t i ) and the provable 5 hypersequent
that derives ⇒ ∃xF S (x) by applying (∃, r) to each component, followed by n − 1 applications of (ec). As HG ∞ admits cut-elimination, the introduced applications of (CU T ) can be removed. A proof of F := Q 1 y 1 . . . Q n y n P in HG ∞ can then be obtained by re-introducing the Skolemized quantifiers in the proof of ⇒ ∃xF S (x), as shown in [7] (see the result (b) above). Proof The prenex formula S := ∃x∀y(P (x) ⊃ P (y)) is valid in G w while it is not in Gödel logic. An interpretation v I of Gödel logic such that v I (S) < 1 is indeed the following: take D = {u i | i ∈ N \ {0}} as its universe and assign v I (P (u i )) = Proof Let F be Q 1 x 1 . . . Q n x n F ′ , with Q i ∈ {∃, ∀} and F ′ quantifier-free. Consider the prenex formula (P ∈ F ′ and x, y = x i , for i = 1, . . . , n)
obtained by combining F with the formula S := ∃x∀y(P (x) ⊃ P (y)) which is valid in G w and not in Gödel logic G ∞ (cf. the proof of Corollary 8). We show that 1 ≤ F p is cut-free provable in RG f o ∞ if and only if F is valid in G ∞ . The claim then follows by the undecidability of the validity problem for the prenex fragment of G ∞ (Lemma 10 below).
Lemma 10 The validity of prenex formulas in Gödel logic is undecidable.
Proof Let P be any prenex formula in the language of G ∞ , which is the same as that of classical logic. Replace each atomic formula A i (x) in P with ¬¬A i (x) and denote the resulting formula by P ¬¬ . It is not difficult to see that P is valid in Gödel logic if and only if P ¬¬ is valid in classical logic (the proof is by induction on the complexity of P and uses the fact that, under any G ∞ interpretation, the value of a double negated atom is either 0 or 1). The claim follows by the undecidability of the prenex fragment of classical logic (and the fact that ¬¬A i (x) is classically equivalent to A i (x)).
∃-analytic calculi: a negative result
In the sequent of relations calculus RG f o ∞ , introduced for G w , the use of (cut) cannot be avoided. Here we show that this is not due to a bad design of our rules but there is a principal obstacle preventing G w from having a certain cut-free calculus, no matter which rules or formalism is used. We indeed provide a general sufficient criterion for a first-order logic not to admit a certain analytic calculus. As a corollary of this result follows that witnessed Gödel logic does not admit any such calculus.
Henceforth we identify a logic with the set of its provable formulas. We write ⊢ L F if L is a logic and F ∈ L. Moreover by a calculus we mean any system consisting of rules and axioms such that there is a method to determine whether a statement is derivable.
We start by formalizing the notion of analytic calculi we deal with (∃-analytic calculi). This arises as an attempt to answer the question what do we expect from a proof theoretic treatment of a first-order logic?
Our notion is general enough to include analyticity in most of the known formalisms as particular case, but also allows us to rule out pathological situations. For instance one could at first think of identifying well-behaved calculi (analytic calculi) simply with calculi whose proofs are "analytic in Leibniz's sense", i.e. they consist only of concepts already contained in the results; in this case, however, any logic whose (valid) formulas can be enumerated would admit such an "analytic" calculus, as shown by the example below.
Example 11 Let L be any logic whose formulas (theorems) can be recursively enumerated. A sequent calculus for L -which would be "analytic" according to the naive notion above -can be defined by taking contraction as the only inference rule and as axioms all sequents ⇒ F, . . . , F (n times) where ⊢ L F and n is the position of F in the enumeration of all formulas of L.
Definition 12 A calculus C is ∃-analytic if each provable existential formula ∃xB(x) (B quantifier-free) has a derivation d in C satisfying the following conditions:
1. d does not contain any universal quantifier and all predicates in d already appear in B;
2. there is a derivation of n i=1 B(t i ) in C, where t 1 , . . . , t n are the ground terms appearing in d.
Example 13 Cut-free calculi in display logic or calculus of structures are ∃-analytic. Any calculus that needs (non-analytic) cuts is not ∃-analytic, due to condition 1 (generalized subformula property). The calculus in Example 11 is also not ∃-analytic, due to condition 2.
The hypothesis of the next proposition will be part of the sufficient criterion. Proposition 14 Let L be any first-order logic whose language contains the connectives ⊃, ∨, the quantifiers ∀, ∃, and in which the following properties hold: (a) ⊢ L A ⊃ A, for any formula A in the language of L (b) ⊢ L P i for the following quantifier shifting laws P i , i ∈ {1, 2}:
, for any term t.
(d) modus ponens and the following rule are in L
Proof Let A be any atomic formula, by property (a) it follows that ⊢ L ∀xA(x) ⊃ ∀xA(x) which gives, by modus ponens and (b.1),
Applying the rule in property (d) to ⊢ L (A(x) ⊃ ∀yA(y)) ⊃ ∀y(A(x) ⊃ A(y)) (coming from (b.2)) we get
Modus ponens together with formulas (1) and (2) yield
Applying the rule in property
here f is a function symbol of the language of L) yields
) together with (3) and modus ponens.
Remark 15
The above properties rely on fixed propositional principles: identity axiom, modus ponens and minimal features of quantifiers (note that (b.2) is already valid in intuitionistic logic). The rule in (d) might be replaced by the axiom ⊢ L A(t) ⊃ ∃xA(x), for any term t and the rule
Definition 16 A logic L satisfies the infiniteness condition if there is an atomic formula A in L such that for no n > 0 and for no sequence of ground terms t 1 , . . . , t n+1 in the language of L, the formula
Theorem 17 Let L be any logic which satisfies the conditions of Proposition 14 and in which the infiniteness condition holds. Then L does not admit any ∃-analytic calculus.
Proof By contradiction. Let A be any atomic formula and assume that there is a ∃-analytic calculus which is sound and complete for L. By Proposition 14 there is a proof in this calculus of the formula ∃x(A(x) ⊃ A(f (x))). Being the calculus ∃-analytic there is a proof of
, for some ground terms t 1 , . . . , t n , which contradicts the infiniteness condition.
Corollary 18 G
w does not admit any ∃-analytic calculus.
Proof Being G w an axiomatic extension of intuitionistic logic it clearly satisfies the conditions (a),(b.2),(c),(d) of Proposition 14. It is not hard to see that
∞ . Condition (b.1) then follows by (cut) and Proposition 5.
Finally, for each n ∈ N there is an interpretation v I in G w in which
). Hence G w satisfies the infiniteness condition.
Applications
We show that many known superintuitionistic and many-valued logics fulfil the sufficient conditions of the previous section. As a corollary of Theorem 17, these logics do not admit any ∃-analytic calculus.
Superintuitionistic logics
Superintuitionistic logics are logics including intuitionistic and included in classical logic. They can be described as the set of formulas that are provable in intuitionistic logic extended with suitable axioms or that are valid in certain (classes of) intuitionistic frames, see e.g. [14] . We will now use the latter notion to provide a semantic characterization of the infiniteness condition over intuitionistic frames. Recall that an intuitionistic frame is a pair
where W i is a non-empty set (of worlds), and is a reflexive and transitive (accessibility) relation on W i . An intuitionistic propositional model (Kripke model) M i = F i , is a frame F i together with a relation (called the forcing) between elements of W i and atomic formulas, satisfying suitable properties (cf. e.g. [14] ). Intuitively, w p means that the atom p is true at world w. Forcing is assumed to be monotonic with respect to the relation , namely, if w w ′ and w p then also w ′ p. As usual a formula P is valid in a Kripke model M i = F i , if P is forced in all worlds of W i , and it is falsified if there is a w ∈ W i such that w does not force P . Given a set of intuitionistic frames F we will refer as the logic of F (and denote it by L F ) to the set of formulas valid in all Kripke models based on all frames F i in F.
Notice that the infiniteness condition only refers to ground formulas and can therefore be characterized at the propositional level (each predicate A(t i ) in Definition 16 can be seen as an atomic propositional formula A i ). More precisely, consider a language containing infinitely many atoms A i . L F satisfies the infiniteness condition if for no n > 0 the formula n i=1 (A i ⊃ A i+1 ) is valid in all Kripke models based on all frames in F.
Lemma 19
The infiniteness condition holds for the logic L F if and only there is a frame W i , in F that satisfies one of the following conditions:
(a) W i contains infinitely many worlds and the worlds are linearly ordered, or (b) there are w, w 1 , w 2 ∈ W i such that w 1 ≤ w 2 , w 2 ≤ w 1 , w ≤ w 1 and w ≤ w 2 .
Proof (⇐=) We show that if F i = W i , satisfies (a) or (b), we can construct a Kripke model M i = F i , such that for no atom A 1 , . . . , A n , n i=1 (A i ⊃ A i+1 ) is valid in M i ; hence the infiniteness condition holds for L F .
Case (a): to falsify n i=1 (A i ⊃ A i+1 ) it is enough to consider a frame in which W i contains n + 1 (linearly ordered) worlds and a Kripke model M i in which each world i forces {A 1 , . . . A i−1 }.
Case (b): take any W i containing two incomparable worlds w 1 , w 2 and a Kripke model M i in which w 1 A i , for all i odd and w 2 A j , for all j even. Hence w falsifies n i=1 (A i ⊃ A i+1 ).
